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Disruption lies in the eyes of the beholder: Firm capabilities and endogeneity of
technological disruption
Abstract
Failure of leading firms to respond to disruptive technological changes has been
explained in terms of their ‘choices’. I investigate the disruptive technological changes in
the global industrial robotics industry and suggest that ‘ability’ of the firms play an
important role in determining their survival chances. This paper suggests that what may
be disruptive (or a sustaining) change may also be a competence-destroying (or a
competence-enhancing) change for a firm. Hence, survival during a disruptive change is
endogenous to the firm's component and architectural capabilities.
Keywords/phrases: Disruptive technological change; Competence-destroying
technological change; Component and architectural capability
 3
One of the most profound effects on the study of technological evolution has been
Christensen’s (1997) research on technological disruption. By suggesting that
technologies that are initially inferior can eventually overturn the mainstream
technologies, Christensen’s research (e.g., Christensen, 1992; Christensen and
Rosenbloom, 1995) has shed new lights on how managers and scholars approach
technological evolution and competition. Technological disruption, in its original
formulation, was characterized as an industry-wide phenomenon that affects all the firms
in an industry and by which new entrants dislodge the established firm. Recent research
by Adner (2002), Daneels (2004), Christensen (2006) and others, has helped scholars to
respond to the question, ‘When are technologies disruptive?’ During disruption, the large
manufacturers face the ‘innovator’s dilemma’- their values and processes lead them to
deliberately ignore the disruptive technology (Adner and Zemsky, 2005). Thus large
firms often 'choose' not to respond to disruptive threats. Christensen and Overdorf (2000)
argued that this strategic choice to ignore the emerging technology resulted in the failure
of several large firms like DEC and RCA.
The above-mentioned depiction of disruptive technological change (henceforth
referred to as 'disruption'- a technological change to which an incumbent chooses not to
respond) raises new, yet unanswered, questions. The broader technology literature
provides evidence of exceptions to the phenomenon of failure of large established firms
during technological changes (see e.g., Tripsas 1997). Rosenbloom (1988) documented
that the National Cash Register survived and eventually regained market success despite
the transition from electromechanical to electronic technology. If resource dependence
creates an inertia that led to the demise of large firms like DEC (Christensen, 1997), then
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how does one explain Sony’s survival during successive generations of technological
changes, including some disruptive ones like the advent of the LCD TV? If disruption
indeed has differential effects on different firms, then what might explain heterogeneous
firm performance during these changes? These exceptions, especially the fact that several
firms have survived numerous waves of technological changes, prompts me to investigate
if the notion of disruption is more nuanced than what extant research suggests. In other
words, the question ‘For whom is a technological change disruptive?’ begs an answer if
we are to have a rich theoretical understanding of disruption.
To answer this question, I build up on the broader technology literature and link
the survival of firms during disruption to their abilities. Leonard-Barton (1992) argues
that a firm’s capabilities acquired prior to technological changes may create ‘competency
traps’. Henderson (2006) links competency1 traps to the phenomenon of technological
disruption and observes that the ‘dynamics of decision-making in the senior team’ as the
dominant explanation, for established firms missing out on disruptive innovations, may
be ‘potentially misleading’. Christensen (2006) also offers tantalizing hints that the
abilities of firms play a crucial role during disruption when he observes that some
disruptive innovations may be ‘unattainable to the incumbent leaders, because the
technology or capital requirements are simply beyond the reach of the incumbent leaders’
(pp.51). Hence, while the role of a firm’s choice has been adequately addressed in the
disruption literature, the potential role of a firm’s ability to respond to disruption has
1 Schilling (2005) observes that the terms ‘competence’ and ‘capability’ have been used
interchangeably in the literature.
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largely been overlooked2. The motivation for this paper is to extend the notion of
disruption by suggesting that the intensity of disruption varies among firms. I investigate
the 10 largest global manufacturers of industrial robots and suggest that firm's survival of
disruption is endogenous to its ability- more specifically to its technological capability.
Through the descriptive-inductive theory building method (Christensen 2006), I build on
Tushman and Anderson (1986) and Henderson and Clark (1990) and suggest that the
survival of a firm in the face of disruption depends on the technological capabilities that
it possesses.
Next, I discuss the relevant literature. Thereafter, I discuss the industrial robotics
industry where a disruption in the mid-1980s had wiped out almost all the U.S.
manufacturers of industrial robots. Then, I use the extant literature to explain the
observations in the industrial robotics industry. Finally, I discuss the implications and the
limitations of this study.
Drivers of disruption: From the industry-level to the firm-level drivers
The notion of disruption has evolved significantly since the early-1990s and has
been refined considerably by Christensen (1997, 2006), Adner (2002), Christensen and
Overdorf (2000), Danneels (2004), Henderson (2006), Govindrajan and Kopalle (2006)
and others. In the early, descriptive stages of this theory, disruption was generally
considered an industry-level phenomenon. Some of the early papers (e.g., Christensen
2 More specifically, the potential role of a firm’s ability to respond to the technological
changes, that share the characteristics identified by Christensen (1997), has largely been
overlooked. These characteristics, discussed on pp.17-19 of this paper, constitute the
theoretical boundary of this paper.
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and Rosenbloom, 1995) identified the major constructs of this theory- the performance
trajectories of sustaining and disruptive technologies and the performance of the products
that customers could absorb. These constructs sought to explain why large incumbent
firms in an industry could not survive the challenge from smaller challengers.
Christensen (1997) suggests that the products based on the disruptive technologies are
typically cheaper, smaller, and simpler than the traditional products. However, over time,
the disruptive products are able to meet the requirements of the mainstream customers
and causes disruption to the large firms who are embedded to the old technology.
However, exceptions like Intel, HP, Sony, and the Japanese hard-disk drive
manufacturers (Chesbrough, 1999), who seem to have survived several challenges of
disruption, gave Christensen an opportunity to refine the theory. Consistent with Sull
(1999) and Tripsas and Gavetti (2000), Christensen and Overdorf (2000) suggested that
survival of firms during disruption is driven by its organizational structure induced
inertia. Several large firms, like HP, set-up autonomous business-units that helped the
firm survive disruptions. Christensen and Overdorf (2000) and Christensen (2006, pp. 43)
points out that the causes of paralysis of industry leaders lie in the firm-level factors, e.g.,
the business models of the firms. This indicates a shift, of the causal mechanism of firm
survival during disruption, from the industry level factors to the firm level factors.
Firm-level technological factors as drivers of firm survival during disruption
The possibility of the existence of firm-level causal factors for explaining firm
survival during disruption opens an interesting avenue for research. It creates a unique
opportunity to investigate if the sources of firm level heterogeneity- for example, the
possession of technological capabilities (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Henderson and
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Clark, 1990; Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Tripsas, 1997) - can explain heterogeneous firm
performance during disruption. Henderson (2006) opened the door for such an
investigation when she suggested that "...incumbent firms fail to respond to disruptive
innovations because responding appropriately requires building competencies they are ill-
equipped to acquire and not because they focus too much on existing customers and high-
margin opportunities" (pp. 7). The notion that managers focus too much on existing
customers was also criticized by Daneels (2004) who argued that the senior managers
often do not have the information needed to make appropriate decisions.
Although the role of firm capabilities during disruption has not been investigated
yet, the role of firm capabilities during technological change has been the focus of intense
scrutiny in the technology literature. Utterback and Abernathy (1975) proposed that
during its evolution, a technology passes through distinct phases. In the fluid phase, firms
experiment with different product features till the emergence of a dominant design. The
next phase of evolution- specific phase- emerges with the dominant design. Building on
this model, Anderson and Tushman (1990) proposed that firms required different
capabilities to compete in the pre- and the post-dominant design phases (or ‘eras’
according to Anderson and Tushman).
Utterback and Abernathy’s (1975) notion of product and process innovation
helped researchers categorize innovations into several different types. Two seminal
papers in this stream of research are Tushman and Anderson (1986) and Henderson and
Clark (1990). Tushman and Anderson (1986) suggested that firms fail to respond to
technological changes when they are competence-destroying ones. Gatignon, Tushman,
Smith, and Anderson (2002) define competence-destroying innovation as that which
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'obsolesces and overturns existing competencies, skills, and know-how'. From this
perspective, it is quite possible that the source of large firm paralysis during what
appears to be a disruption is in reality a competence-destroying change.
Building on Tushman and Anderson (1986), Henderson and Clark (1990) noted
that the lack of crucial component and architectural knowledge was detrimental for firm
survival in the photolithographic industry. More recently, Klepper and Simmons (2000)
observed that prior experience in manufacturing radios helped firms in the television
industry. Cohen and Levinthal (1989) referred to the prior knowledge acquired by a firm
as its absorptive capacity. Thus, it is quite possible that the source of large firm paralysis
during what appears to be a disruption is in reality a competence-destroying change
where the firm lacks the absorptive capacity to respond due to its lack of component
and/or architectural capability. Thus, theoretically, this paper traces its heritage to
Utterback and Abernathy (1975) through Tushman and Anderson (1986) and Henderson
and Clark (1990). Following Henderson and Clark (1990), I concentrate on component
and architectural capabilities as the two drivers of technological competence of a firm.
Next, I discuss the pertinent literature that deals with component and architectural
capabilities.
Component capability. The engineering design literature has a long history of
distinguishing between the components and the product as a whole (see e.g., Marples,
1961). Clark (1985) defined a component as a physically distinct portion of the product
that embodies a core design concept and performs a well-defined function. According to
Vincenti (1990), component capability includes an understanding of the technologies and
materials embodied in components, theories and design heuristics for manipulating them,
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empirical data on material properties and the performance of alternative design
parameters, and the skills and problem solving strategies accumulated in the process of
applying this knowledge. Khanna and Iansiti (1997) illustrate the central role of
component capabilities in helping mainframe manufacturers develop a number of
‘competence-destroying’ technological innovations over time. Recently Roy and
McEvily (2004) demonstrated that breadth of component capability affected the survival
prospects of firms. Following these researchers, I concentrate on component capability as
source of persistent performance differential amongst incumbents during disruption.
Architectural capability. Architectural capability of a firm is the knowledge of
the linkage among the various components that the firm uses to manufacture its products.
Architectural capability affects product performance by determining how, and how well,
individual components fit together (i.e. how the set of components works together to
deliver the product’s functions; cf. Baldwin and Clark, 2000). Henderson and Clark
(1990) observed that accumulated architectural knowledge acquired by designing
products of the previous generations could blind a firm to the design changes required to
respond to new technologies. Other scholars (see e.g., Kogut and Zander, 1992) have
used terms such as integrative and combinative capabilities to suggest that architectural
capability may assist firms in surviving technological transitions by enabling firms to
integrate their component knowledge in new and flexible ways. Thus, I concentrate on
architectural capability of incumbents as being a source of differential firm performance
during disruption.
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Next, I discuss the context of this paper and explain the changes in the industrial
robotics industry. Then I explain the changes in terms of the technological capabilities of
the firms.
Industrial Robotics industry
Data
I collected data on the industrial robotics industry from various secondary
sources, including Industrial Robots- A Survey (1972); Specifications and Applications
of Industrial Robots in Japan (1981, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1990, 1992, 1997); Robotics
Industry Directory (1982, 1983); British Robot Association’s Datafile (1982-83, 1987,
1997); A Survey of Industrial Robots (1980, 1982); Industrial Robot Specifications
(Cugy and Page, 1983); Industrieroboter (1979); Handbuch Industrieroboter (1982);
International Robotics Industry Directory (1984); International Robotics Products
Directory (1989, 1990); Industrial Robots Productivity Equipment Series (1983, 1985).
My sample consists of almost 1000 observations of new robot introductions or
innovations on existing products by the nine largest global robot manufacturers. In
addition to these, various Robotic Industries Association (RIA) publications and trade
magazines like Industrial Robot, Industrial Robots International, Robotics Today,
Industrial Robots- A summary and forecast (1983), Karlsson (1991), USITC Pub. 1475,
Klepper (1985), Sadamoto (1981), and Society of Manufacturing Engineers Industrial
Robots Forecast and Trends (1982, 1985) provided valuable information. The product
introduction data spanned from 1972 through 1997. I obtained the number of electrical
control system patents assigned to each large manufacturer during 1970-1985 from the
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USPTO website. I obtained the product-line information for the large manufacturers in
1980 from their annual reports and from various secondary sources and trade journals.
Industrial robotics industry: From inception till the mid-1980s
A generally accepted definition of robot is ‘a reprogrammable multifunctional
manipulator designed to move material, parts, tools or specialized devices through
variable programmed motions for the performance of a variety of tasks’. In Japan, a
broader definition classifies certain other forms of transfer devices as robots too. The
word robot is derived from a Czech word ‘robota’ which means drudgery. The industrial
robot industry started in the U.S. with a group of companies whose expertise lay in
mechanically engineered products- machine tools, material-handling, and related
machinery. The pioneers of the industry include American firms like Unimation (a
subsidiary of Condec Corp.), Cincinnati Milacron, Prab, and AMF Versatran. Unimation
sold the first industrial robot to General Motors in 1961. By 1969, there were about 20
robots in service in the U.S., and in 1970 the U.S. robot population increased to 200. This
number increased to 3849 by 1980. By the early 1980s, large U.S. manufacturers like
General Electric, Westinghouse, and IBM had started manufacturing robots. In 1982,
there were about 50 U.S. manufacturers of robots. Two of the largest firms (Unimation
and Cincinnati Milacron) accounted for almost 60% of the total shipments in the U.S. In
1984, General Motors, the largest buyer of robots in the U.S., entered into a technical
collaboration with Fanuc of Japan to manufacture robots. General Motors-Fanuc (GMF)
sold robots that were largely designed by Fanuc in Japan. Most of the U.S.
manufacturers, including GMF, however, exited the industry by the end of the 1980s.
Figure 1 shows the robot population of various countries during the time of this study.
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Japan has been the leader in the demand for industrial robots and USA has been the
traditional second-largest market for robot manufacturers. This is consistent with
Mansfield’s (1989) observation that Japanese users used larger number of robots as
compared to the American users. Figure 2 shows the severe contraction of net new orders
of industrial robots in the U.S. during the mid 1980s and early 1990s. The number of
American robot manufacturers, which had increased from about 7 in the early-1970s to
about 50 in the early-1980s, decreased to just 1 by the mid-1990s.
Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 about here
The evolution of the industrial robotics industry is, however, largely synonymous
with the evolution of the industry in Japan. In 1967, the first robot was imported into
Japan. In 1968, Kawasaki Heavy Industries started manufacturing robots in technical
collaboration with Unimation. Subsequently other electrical and electronic firms like
Hitachi, Toshiba, Fuji Electric, and Fanuc started manufacturing robots. Shortage of labor
and the oil shocks of the 1970s provided the boost to the industrial robotics industry in
Japan. By the end of 1970s, Japan’s robot population was around 14000 and there were
about 140 Japanese robot manufacturers. The early entrants in the European robot
industry were firms like ABB, Olivetti, and Siemens, and large automobile manufacturers
like Volkswagen, Fiat, Renault, and Volvo.
The primary use of robots includes casting, forging, spot welding, painting,
machining, assembly, palletizing, inspection and testing, and education. Traditionally, in
the U.S. and in Western Europe, welding robots are about 30% of total population of
robots followed by casting robots. In contrast, the predominant traditional use (approx.
30-40%) of robots in Japan has been in the assembly jobs. In the U.S. and Europe, the
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automobile industry was the largest buyer of robots, but in Japan, electrical and electronic
product manufacturers were the largest buyers.
Description of a robot
A robot hand (or the manipulator) is actuated by the command from the
controller, which can be a computer or a teach pendant. The command goes through a
power conversion unit, which translates the electric signal to drive the actuator. Robot’s
movements are powered by one of the three types of actuators- electrical, hydraulic, or
pneumatic. In an electrical actuator, the power conversion unit consists of a digital-to-
analog converter and an amplifier with a power supply source. In a hydraulic actuator, the
power conversion unit consists of a pump and a cooler. In a pneumatic actuator, the
power conversion unit typically consists of compressor, servo-valve, and an amplifier.
Two of the most important performance attributes of a robot are the repeatability
(i.e., the precision with which a robot can return to the same position) and the load
capacity (i.e., the maximum load that the robot’s arm can carry) (Klepper, 1985; Katila
and Ahuja, 2002). Everything else being equal, the lower the value of a robot's
repeatability, the better it is, and higher the value of load capacity, the better it is.
Traditional manufacturers of robots like Unimation and Prab have relied on hydraulic
actuators to control their robots. Robots with hydraulic actuators had the highest payload
capacity. Robots with electric actuators had better repeatability and accuracy. The main
advantage of robots with pneumatic actuators was low cost.
Disruption in the industrial robotics industry
Although early robot manufacturers utilized hydraulic actuators, changes in both
the demand conditions and technological innovations in electrical control technology
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ensured that most of the robots manufactured since the mid-1980s utilized electrical
actuators.
Changes in the demand conditions: Although the early users of robots were the
automobile manufacturers, it was clear by the end of the 1970s that the future of robotics
industry lay in small-parts assembly. The Carnegie-Mellon University Robotics Survey
(1981) suggested that since 1976, an increasing portion of the users of industrial robots
were the ones engaged in small-batch sized custom manufacturing rather than those
engaged in mass production techniques. By 1987, over 60% of the total population of
industrial robots was used in spot welding of car bodies in the automotive industry and
most of the automobile manufacturers had no further scope for automation in the
production processes (Industrial Robot, Sept. 1987, pp. 150).
The growth of the small-batch manufacturers coincided with the advent of small-
parts assembly techniques used in manufacturing computers, calculators, cell phones, and
other electronic gadgets. Whereas the robots for traditional assembly were developed
with payload capacity as the primary performance criterion, the robots for small-parts
assembly were developed for high-technology and mission-critical assembly operations.
In the small-parts assembly robots, accurate handling of delicate parts with high
repeatability became the primary product attribute (Intelledex Inc. Report published in
Robotics World, June 1983). Electrical robots were better suited than either hydraulic or
pneumatic robots for the operations requiring high repeatability. During the 1980s, more
and more electronic assembly plants started relying on the light assembly electric robots
not only for higher repeatability as compared to human labor, but also for the cleaner
operations that reduced the chances of contamination of the wafer surface from the
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spillage of fluids in the hydraulic robots. Demand from the electronic sector fueled a
significant portion of the growth of the industrial robotics industry during the 1980s and
1990s (Carlisle, 2003). Alongwith the electronic assembly plants, small appliances, food
processing, and pharmaceuticals industries also valued the high repeatability and other
performance features of the electrical robots. Figure 3.1 shows the relative growth in the
demand of electrical small-parts assembly robots as compared to the growth in sales of
hydraulic arc-welding robots in the U.S. in mid-1980s. Figure 3.2 shows the proportion
of electrical robots sold to the electrical and electronic assembly industry as percentage of
the total robots shipped in Japan from 1979 to 1989. Figure 4.1 shows the dramatic
changes in the proportions of assembly, welding and machine loading/ unloading (i.e.,
machine tending) robots in the robot populations of Japan and the U.S. in the early 1980s.
Figure 4.2 shows the proportions of assembly, welding, and machine tending robots in
the domestic shipments of robots in the U.S. during late-1970s and early 1980s.
Thus, the altered demand condition, especially from the 1980s onwards, was one
of the factors that led to the predominant use of electrical robots over the hydraulic and
pneumatic ones.
Insert Figures 3.1, 3.2, 4.1 and 4.2 about here
Innovations in the microprocessor and electrical motor technologies: The small-parts
assembly tasks typically require controlling the movement of a robot-arm in six or more
axes. Movement control, in turn, requires real time processing of complex algorithms
using microprocessors. Innovations in the computing power of microprocessors in the
late-1970s opened new fields of applications of industrial robots. Manufacturers were
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now able to design robots capable of performing small-parts assembly tasks (Robotics
World, June 1983, pp. 17).
In addition to the innovations in microprocessors, these new applications of robots
also benefited from the innovations in the electrical motor technologies during the 1970s
and 1980s. Since the early-1970s, significant innovations enhanced the capabilities of
brushless AC motors (Brown, 1983). Simultaneously, increases in the AC servomotors
power output in the early 1980s enabled the electrical robots to increase the load
capacity. Asea's (now ABB) introduction of new robots exemplifies the innovations in
the electrical technology. ABB introduced the first robot with electrical actuator in 1974.
As with any new product that leads to disruption, this new robot, IRB-6, had a load
capacity of 13.2 lbs. This was considerably inferior to the rated load capacity of 99 lbs of
MKII Series 4000 hydraulic robots by Unimation available since 1972. Also in 1972,
Prab’s Third Generation hydraulic robots had achieved a load capacity of 55 lbs. By the
end of the 1970s, ABB's electric robots had surpassed these load capacities. Spray
painting robots also exemplify the improvements in the electric robot technology. Spray
painting had traditionally been the stronghold of hydraulic robots, but innovations in the
electric motor technology enabled ABB to manufacture electric spray painting robots in
1988.
Changes in the components used in manufacturing automobiles and other
products also helped electrical robots to replace the hydraulic robots in the traditional
assembly and manufacturing firms. The average weight of the parts handled in the
automotive industry were around 25 lbs in 1980 and this figure was coming down as
more and more parts were being manufactured with light-weight metals like aluminum
 17
rather than steel. The Industrial Robots- A Delphi Forecast of Markets and Technology
(published by the Society of Manufacturing Engineers, 1982, 1985) predicted that the
average weight of parts in the automobile industry to come down to around 15 lbs by
1985. As the weight of the components reduced, the users of robots demanded medium
load capacities rather than high load capacity robots. This implies that, over time, more
and more buyers could rely on the electric robots for their load capacity requirements.
Yet another significant technological innovation that greatly enhanced the
suitability of electric motors for small-parts assembly jobs is the development of the
Direct-Drive robots. Originally developed by the Robotics Institute of the Carnegie-
Mellon University in 1980, these robots eliminated the use of gear-reducers in the robots.
As a result of this change, the repeatability of the robots could be enhanced significantly.
Adept Technology Inc. introduced the first direct-drive robot in 1983 and attained a
repeatability of 0.001 inch. This was an order-of-magnitude better than the repeatability
of traditional robots with gear reducers.
The above-mentioned innovations helped the electrical robots to be applied not
only to the emerging small-parts assembly applications involving high repeatability and
low load capacities, but also to the mainstream traditional hydraulic robot applications
involving higher load capacities3. Since industrial robots have distinct components and
3 Although initial research by Christensen suggested the importance of vertical
differentiation, latter extensions by Christensen and others suggested that horizontally
differentiated products could also lead to disruption. Ecton Inc.'s Doppler Echo Machine
(Harvard Business School Case # 5-600-129) and Du Pont's Kevlar fiber (Harvard
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subsystems that are linked into product architectures, and since the industrial robotics
industry has faced serious upheavals during the late-1970s and early 1980s, this industry
is well suited for an investigation of the role of firm capabilities during disruption. Next, I
map the technological changes in this industry to Christensen’s notion of disruption.
Mapping the changes in the industrial robotics industry to disruption
Christensen’s (1997) notion of disruption can nicely explain these changes in the
industrial robotics industry. The traditional hydraulic robots emphasized load capacity as
the primary performance criteria. Arm oscillation in the hydraulic robots severely
restricted the repeatability that could be achieved with these robots. The electrical robot
manufacturers initially targeted a different market segment, where the buyers emphasized
repeatability of the robot as the primary performance criteria. Similar to the disruption of
minicomputer manufacturing by the personal computer manufacturing (Christensen and
Overdorf, 2000), the hydraulic robots were disrupted by the electrical robots. As shown
in Figures 5 and 64, the traditional hydraulic robots were high on the load capacity
dimension, but low on the repeatability dimension. The traditional electrical robots were
high on the repeatability dimension and low on the load-capacity dimension. However,
the technological changes in electrical technology during the late 1970s and early 1980s
Business School Case # 9-698-079) were both sources of disruption and were
horizontally differentiated from the mainstream products in their respective markets.
4 Figure 5 is derived from Figure 11 (described later) by taking the best repeatability
figures for the electric and hydraulic robots separately. Similarly, Figure 6 is derived
from Figure 10 (also described later) by taking the highest load capacity of the electric
and the hydraulic robots.
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moved the electrical robots to even better repeatability and higher load capacities.
Performance improvements in the hydraulic robots were comparatively incremental.
Figures 7 and 85 show the performance improvements in both hydraulic and electrical
robot markets. These figures have the three basic elements for disruption as described by
Christensen (1997). These are- the upward sloping trajectories of performance
improvement for the hydraulic and the electrical robots, and the performance (i.e., load
capacity) demanded by industrial robot users.
The challenge to the industrial robot manufacturers in the late-1970s and early-
1980s satisfies most of the characteristics of disruption (Govindarajan and Kopalle,
2006). The characteristics are:
a) Electrical robots in the 1970s and early 1980s under-performed the
hydraulic robots in the performance attribute (i.e., load-capacity) that
the mainstream customers (i.e., the automobile manufacturers) valued.
b) New features (e.g., repeatability) offered by the electrical robots were
not highly valued by the mainstream users.
c) Disruptive products are typically cheaper than the mainstream products.
Likewise, the electric robots were also typically cheaper than the
hydraulic robots. Figure 4 shows that between 1980 and 1983, the U.S.
population of assembly robots, which are electric robots, increased
dramatically. Figure 9 suggests that, for the first time in the history of
the industrial robotics industry, the average price of robots in the U.S.
fell during this period. In the early 1980s, the electrical robots for
5 Similar to Figure 6, this figure is also derived from Figure 10
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small-parts assembly would typically cost around $20,000 and the
hydraulic robots for traditional jobs would cost around $60,000.
d) Over time, the performance of the disruptive products improves and
satisfies the demand of the mainstream customers. As shown in Figures
7 and 8, by the early-1980s, innovations in the electrical motor
technology helped electrical robot manufacturers like ABB and Fanuc
to meet the needs of the most demanding welding and painting jobs in
the automobile factories.
The preceding discussion makes it clear that the industrial robotics industry faced
disruption during the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Insert Figures 5-9 about here
Consequences of disruption in the industrial robotics industry
The effects of this disruption were felt across three continents. In the U.S., most
of the four original pioneers of industrial robots did not survive the 1980s. Unimation
was taken over by Westinghouse in 1984, which in turn, sold the direct-drive robot unit
as Adept Technologies in 1984, licensed the hydraulic robot business to Prab in 1987 and
sold the rest of the electric robot business to a Swiss robot distributor, Staubli, in 1988. In
1990, Cincinnati Milacron sold its robot business to ABB. AMF Versatran was taken
over by Prab in 1979, which, in turn, disbanded its robotics business around 1989. In
Europe, ABB acquired the Norwegian company Trallfa, the pioneer of the continuous-
path hydraulic painting robots, in 1985. In Japan, Kawasaki terminated its contract with
Unimation in 1985 and entered into a new contract with Adept to manufacture direct-
drive electrical robots. Despite these drastic consequences, several manufacturers like
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ABB, Hitachi, Kawasaki, and Matsushita survived the disruption. Of these survivors,
Mitsubishi and Kawasaki successfully switched from being hydraulic robot
manufacturers to electrical robot manufacturers.
Next, I concentrate on the abilities of the large robot manufacturers to explain
their heterogeneous performance during disruption.
Investigation of the drivers of heterogeneous firm performance during disruption in
the Industrial Robotics industry
To explain the differential effect of disruption in the industrial robotics industry, I
concentrate on the largest robot manufacturers in the U.S., Europe, and Japan like
Unimation, Prab, Cincinnati Milacron, Asea (now ABB), Kawasaki, Fuji Electric, Fanuc,
Hitachi, Mitsubishi, and Matsushita. This is consistent with most of the extant research
on disruption (e.g., Christensen, 1997), which concentrate on the large manufacturers
only. During the late 1970s, the combined market-share of these manufacturers was more
than 50% in their respective home markets. In the U.S. in 1980, Cincinnati Milacron,
Unimation, and Prab controlled almost 70% of the total marketshare. Figure 10 shows the
corporate sales and robot sales of these manufacturers in the early 1980s.
Since the hydraulic robot technology was supplanted by the electrical robot
technology, I first investigate if the electrical robots produced by these manufacturers
indeed had better repeatability and if the electrical robots eventually matched the load
capacity of the hydraulic robots. Thereafter, I look into the capabilities of the
manufacturers as drivers of differential firm performance during disruption.
Comparison of the performance parameters of hydraulic and electrical robots: I
compared the load capacity (in pounds) and repeatability (in inches) of the robots
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introduced by the major robot manufacturers mentioned above. Figure 11 shows the
maximum Load Capacity of the products introduced by the various industrial robot
manufacturers over the years. The trajectories of the improvements of load capacity in the
industrial robots industry closely parallels those of the hard disk drive capacities
mentioned in Christensen and Rosenbloom (1995, Fig. 4, pp.244). Hydraulic robots by
Prab have been the historical leaders in the load capacity, followed by the hydraulic
robots of Unimation. The four leaders in load capacity during the 1970s were Prab,
Unimation, Cincinnati Milacron, and Kawasaki- all manufacturers of hydraulic robots at
that time. However, by the early 1980s, electrical robot manufacturers were catching up
with the load capacities of all these manufacturers (except the extremely high load
capacity robots by Prab). ABB’s electrical robots had almost achieved the load capacity
of Cincinnati Milacron’s hydraulic robots around this time. By the mid-1980s, several
electrical robot manufacturers including ABB, Fanuc, and others had surpassed the
highest load capacity of Unimation robots. By the early 1990s, ABB’s electrical robots
were challenging the highest load capacities of the Prab robots.
Figure 12 provides the information on the improvements of robot’s repeatability.
Since the mid-1980s, Japanese firms have been the leaders in repeatability. Fuji achieved
a repeatability of 0.0004 inch in 1986, and Matsushita was the closest to this with a
repeatability of 0.0006 inch achieved in 1997. Unimation, a traditional manufacturer of
hydraulic robots, tried to face the challenge from the electric robot manufacturers by
taking over Vicarm and introducing electrical robots in the early 1980s. Unimation’s
repeatability in the electrical robots approached that of Matsushita in the mid-1980s.
However, Cincinnati Milacron’s electric robots’ repeatability lagged that of the major
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competitors. Kawasaki’s efforts to introduce highly repeatable electric robots were
largely successful and, by the mid-1980s, its robots achieved better repeatability than
those of the ABB robots.
Insert Figures 10, 11, and 12 about here
Thus, the load capacity of the hydraulic robots of the largest manufacturers was
initially better than the load capacity of the electrical robots. Similarly, repeatability of
the electrical robots by the largest manufacturers was also better than the repeatability of
the hydraulic robots. Hence, the product performance data from the robotics industry are
indeed consistent with disruption. Next, I investigate the technological capabilities of the
large manufacturers.
Technological capabilities and the differential effects of disruption
Component capability of large manufacturers: As a result of the surge in
demand for the small-parts assembly robots, the knowledge of components used in
electric robots, like the converters and amplifiers, became crucial. Firms, that entered the
robotics industry from electrical engineering driven industries like the numerical control
systems manufacturing, are likely to find this transition quite easy. Given their pre-
existing absorptive capacity in electrical engineering driven products, the challenge to
manufacture converters and amplifiers for robots will be a competence-enhancing one.
Kumaresan and Miyazaki (1999) observed that the electrical control systems became an
important part of industrial robots and the Japanese manufactures historically had a lead
over the American manufacturers in this technology. On the other hand, firms that
entered the industrial robotics industry from primarily mechanical engineering driven
industries like machine tools, are going to find this transition a competence-destroying
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one. This is because the crucial aspects of a mechanically engineered system are the
mechanics and the movement of the components and subsystems used in the product. In
case of a robot, the crucial aspect of the hydraulic robot is the pump and the distribution
of the fluid through the use of valves.
Hence, in the case of disruption in the industrial robot industry, the firms that had
prior experience in electrical engineering products were likely to be in a competence-
enhancing scenario and the firms that had prior experience in the mechanical engineering
fields were likely to be in a competence-destroying scenario.
To track the component capability of the large manufacturers, I explored the
number of electrical control system patents that each of the large manufacturers held in
the U.S. during the period 1970-1985. Cohen and Levin (1990) suggested that patents
held by a firm represent its knowledge. Katila and Ahuja's (2002) study on the industrial
robotics industry points out that the more knowledgeable firms are able to search deeper
and introduce more products. Accordingly, I assume that if a firm was assigned a patent
in electrical control systems, then it possessed the component knowledge required to
manufacture robots with electrical actuators. Figure 13 shows that the Japanese
manufacturers like Hitachi and Matsushita held more than 400 electrical control systems
related patents during 1970-1985, but Unimation and Prab held less than 10 patents
during that period. Thus, Unimation and Prab had limited component capability as
compared to other manufacturers.
Hence, from the component capability standpoint, disruption in the industrial
robotics industry was relatively more competence-destroying for the non-survivors like
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Unimation and Prab and relatively more competence-enhancing for the survivors like
ABB and Hitachi.
Architectural capability of large manufacturers: The increasingly
sophisticated demand from the electronics industry during the 1980s meant that the
manufactures of robots had to precisely design, link the components, and manufacture the
robots so as to reduce the downtime required for maintenance. Among other things, this
implies that the firms had to link the components and subsystems in ways to reduce the
friction among the components, effectively dissipate the heat generated by the operation
of the system, and so on. From an engineering viewpoint, firms acquire architectural
capability by manufacturing different products in which the components and subsystems
are linked in different ways. Knowledge of linkage among the components and
subsystems helps firms to create new products and also creates the absorptive capacity to
realize the linkages among the components in robots with different actuators. Hence the
product-line breadth (Kekre and Srinivasan, 1990) of firms should indicate the
architectural capability of firms. The more the product line breadth of a firm, the more
likely it is that the firm can utilize some of its existing knowledge of architectural
capability in manufacturing robots. Hence, I explored the product-line breadth of the
robot manufacturers as a measure of architectural capability overlap of the manufacturers.
From the annual reports and various other secondary sources, I measured the number of
different products that a manufacturer offered in 1980. For example, Unimation
manufactured only robots in 1980, and hence its product-line breadth is ‘1’. Hitachi,
manufactured several different types of products, like household equipments, robots,
machine tools, and so on, and its product-line breadth was ‘15’. Figure 14 documents the
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product-line breadth of various manufacturers. It is evident that Hitachi, Matsushita,
Mitsubishi, and some other manufacturers had a higher value of product line breadth than
either Unimation or Prab.
Hence, from architectural capability standpoint, disruption in the industrial
robotics industry was likely to be more competence-destroying for the non-survivors like
Unimation and Prab and likely more competence-enhancing for the survivors like
Matsushita and Mitsubishi.
Insert Figures 13 and 14 about here
Technological capability and the fate of the firms: Figures 13 and 14 suggest
that for the non-surviving U.S. manufacturers like Unimation, and Prab, unfortunately,
disruption was a relatively more competence-destroying one than for the survivors like
ABB, Hitachi, and others. Unimation was essentially a de-novo entrant in the industrial
robotics industry. It had less than 10 electrical control system patents. It tried to meet the
challenge by introducing electrical robots in 1980s, but as Christensen (1997) suggests,
large producers usually wait too long before they adopt the new technology. Prab had
about 6 electrical control system patents and concentrated on manufacturing hydraulic
robots. In terms of component capability, Cincinnati Milacron with almost 100 patents
was better placed than both Unimation and Prab to meet the challenge of manufacturing
robots with better repeatability, but was worse off to meet the challenge as compared to
Hitachi, Fuji Electric, Matsushita, and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. Hitachi held more
than 1000 control system patents during 1970-1985. Matsushita held more than 400
control system patents during that period. Thus, from the component capability
perspective, the challenge in the industrial robotics industry was largely a competence-
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destroying one for the non-survivors- Unimation and Prab. For the survivors- Hitachi and
others- the challenge was a competence-enhancing one.
In terms of architectural capability too, Unimation and Prab were distinctly
disadvantaged against their competitors like Hitachi, Fuji, Matsushita, and Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries. Unimation, being a de-novo entrant to the industrial robotics industry
manufactured only robots. Prab, a conveyor belt manufacturer, diversified into robots.
Unlike Unimation and Prab, Kawasaki had other businesses, like the machine tool and
the plastic molding machine manufacturing businesses, which provided some
architectural knowledge to manufacture the new type of robots. For firms like Hitachi,
Fanuc and others, who possessed the absorptive capacity to develop the electrical
engineering components for electrical actuators and the necessary linkages, disruption in
the industrial robotics industry was largely a competence-enhancing one.
Contrary to Christensen’s (1997) notion of the dependence of large firms on
existing customers, there are numerous evidences to suggest that it was unlikely that the
large robot manufacturers had ignored the emergence of the electrical robot as a
strategic choice. Industrial Robots International (4/11/1983, pp.2) reported that Japanese
automakers were shifting from the hydraulic to the electrical robots due to the improved
power output of electrical actuators. The prospect of a possible shrinkage of the
traditional hydraulic robot market in the automobile industry had prompted Unimation,
the largest U.S. robot manufacturer in the 1970s, to acquire Vicarm Inc. in 1977 for
manufacturing electrical robots. In the early 1980s, Unimation introduced the PUMA
range of electric robots, which were capable of a repeatability of 0.0008 inch. Cincinnati
Milacron, which manufactured only hydraulic robots in the 1970s, started manufacturing
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electric robots in 1982. Kawasaki, traditionally a manufacturer of only hydraulic robots,
terminated the collaboration with Unimation in 1985, and entered into a new one with
Adept Technology, the pioneer of direct-drive electrical robots. By the early 1990s,
Kawasaki’s entire portfolio of industrial robots comprised of only electrical robots.
Industrial Robots International (4/11/1983, pp.2) reported that all major hydraulic robot
manufacturers of Japan were introducing electrical robots in the early 1980s. By 1983,
56% of the industrial robots installed in the U.S. had electrical actuators and the trend
was towards greater use of electrical robots (Industrial Robots, 1983). Moreover, as
shown in Figure 3, by the early 1980s, the assembly robot segment was already the
largest robot segment in Japan and, in both Japan and the U.S., it was growing faster than
the mainstream welding robot segment. Additionally, Robot News International, a
magazine popular among the manufacturers and the users, predicted in its June 1982
issue that between 1981 and 1991, the Assembly robots would grow 3% to 23% of the
total robot population in the U.S.
Thus, as suggested by Henderson (2006), the survival of firms during disruption is
likely driven by their abilities- the component and architectural capabilities.
Discussion
This paper sought to answer the question, ‘For whom is a technological change
disruptive?'. In the context of the industrial robotics industry, the answer is that the
change is a disruptive one for a firm that faces a competence-destroying change.
Theoretically, this paper brings together the two distinct streams of technological
capability literature and disruption literature. While the traditional technological
capability literature has pointed out the beneficial role of firm-level capabilities during
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technological changes (Henderson and Clark, 1990), the disruption literature has
suggested that firm’s processes and value systems play a crucial role during disruption
(Christensen and Overdorf, 2000). This paper brings these two streams of literature
together and suggests that the findings of prior research on competence-destroying
technological changes can also explain firm performance during disruption. The
theoretical contribution of this paper is shown below:
Technological capability literature:
Disruption literature:
Christensen’s (1997) notion of disruption has occupied the center-stage of the
technological change literature for more than a decade. The failure of firms to respond to
disruption has been explained in terms of their choices- the new emerging market appears
financially unattractive to the large firms and hence the value systems of large firms act
as a source of inertia that prevents the large firm from responding effectively to the
disruptive challenge from new entrants. Although the ‘choice’ argument of disruption is
well documented, my research suggests that the effects of disruption on the firms are
more nuanced than originally thought. Consistent with Henderson's (2006) assertions, I
find that the causal mechanism of firm survival during disruption may also lie in the
competencies acquired by the firm prior to the change. Consistent with the suggestions of
Firm’s technological capabilities:
component and architectural capabilities
Firm performance during
technological change
Firm’s processes and
value systems
Firm performance
during disruption
Contribution
of this paper
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Tushman and Anderson (1986), it appears that what may be a severely disruptive
competence-destroying technological change for one firm may be a sustaining
competence-enhancing change for another. Whether a challenge is disruptive or
sustaining depends on the technological capabilities possessed by the firm, i.e., disruption
lies in the eyes of the beholder. My findings, to some extent, diverge from those of
Henderson and Clark (1990). Henderson and Clark (1990) found that even if the firms
possessed the component capability, their architectural capability made them inertial. In
the case of the robotics industry I do not find any evidence of that inertia. Large robot
manufacturers seem to have benefited from both the component and the architectural
capabilities.
The paper opens up new avenues for research, especially by suggesting that the
firm’s ‘ability’ to respond to disruption has largely been overlooked. Building up on
Henderson (2006), this paper also suggests that the primary driver of firm paralysis
during disruption is the capabilities possessed by the firm. Firms’ absorptive capacity can
ensure that what is a disruption for one firm is a sustaining change for another firm. This
paper supports Hannan and Freeman's (1977) perspective that coarse-grained changes
(like the one in the industrial robotics industry) should favor the large generalist firms
over the small specialist firms. The findings of this paper are also consistent with
Markides and Williamson's (1996) perspective that related diversification may be
beneficial for the firms.
This paper’s findings are consistent with those of several other researchers who
have investigated the industrial robotics industry. Dahlin (1993) predicted that the
Japanese manufacturers would continue to dominate the robotics industry and this paper
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explains why some of them have been successful against the American manufacturers.
This paper also extends Katila’s extensive investigation of the industrial robotics industry
in two ways. First, Katila (2004) suggested that firms with technological experience are
likely to be more innovative and this paper points out that experience with the electrical
engineering technology was more important than mechanical engineering knowledge.
Second, Katila (1999) examined the robotics industry from early the 1980s onwards and I
investigate the industry from 1972 onwards, thereby extending Katila’s observations to a
longer time period.
The paper suffers from several drawbacks. First, it lacks the panel data analyses
that could have helped establish a stricter causality. Second, I do not investigate the
history and capability of several other large robot manufacturers like Kuka Robotics of
Germany. Third, in addition to technological capabilities, a firm possesses several other
types of capabilities and routines, like the complementary capabilities and marketing
capabilities, and I do not take those into account. For example, Benner and Tushman
(2003) suggest that a firm’s process management practices affect its capabilities. In this
paper I do not investigate the process management practices of a firm. Firms frequently
exploit their complementary assets (Rothaermel, 2001) and I do not take these assets into
account in my paper.
Despite these limitations, this paper brings prior research on technological
capabilities into the realm of disruption. It suggests that even if a firm is able to overcome
its organizational structure induced inertia by creating separate strategic business units
for the disruptive products (Christensen and Overdorf, 2000), it may lack the vital
component and architectural capabilities to respond effectively and may be forced to exit.
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Figure 1: Robot population (Source: Robotic Industries Association (RIA) publications)
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Figure 2: Net New Orders (in $ MM) of Industrial Robots in the U.S. (Sources: Industry
Flash, Vol.1, No.4; Industrial Robot International- various years)
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Figure 3.1 Evidence of the growing importance of electrical robots- Sales in $MM of
hydraulic arc-welding robots and electrical small-parts assembly robots in the U.S.
(Source: Industrial Robot, March 1986, pp.6)
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Figure: 3.2 Evidence of the growing importance of electrical robots- proportion of
electrical robots sold to the electrical and electronic assembly industry as percentage of
the total robots shipped in Japan (Sources: Sadamoto, 1981, pp. 134; Karlsson, 1991)
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Figure 4.1: Proportion of robots of various applications in the total robot populations of
U.S. and Japan (Machine tending= Machine tool loading and unloading robots)
(Sources: RIA Worldwide Survey- 1981, 1986; Industrial Robot- 1987-1994)
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Figure 4.2: Proportions of robots of various applications in the domestic shipments of
robots in the U.S. (Machine tending= Machine tool loading and unloading robots)
(Source: USITC Pub. 1475, Dec. 1983)
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Figure 5: Improvement of repeatability of hydraulic and electric robots (Sources:
Database created from several secondary sources)
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Figure 6: Improvement of maximum load capacity of hydraulic and electric robots
(Sources: Database created from several secondary sources)
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Figure 7: Three basic elements for disruption in the industrial robot industry 
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Figure 8: Load capacity improvements in hydraulic and electrical robots (Sources:
several secondary sources; Minimum load capacity for the heaviest part used in heavy
manufacturing is derived from Industrial Robots: Delphi Forecast of Markets and
Technology, 1982, 1985, by the Society of Manufacturing Engineers)
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Figure 9: Average price of robots in the U.S. in $ '000s.(Source:USITC Pub.1475, 12/83)
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Figure 10: Corporate and Robot sales of major robot manufacturers (in $ MM) (Sources:
Annual Reports, Robotics Age, and Industrial Robot, various issues) (Note: Robot sales
of ABB and MHI are not available)
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Figure 11: Load capacity of new robots introduced by large manufacturers (Note:
CM(H) and CM(E)- Cincinnati Milacron’s hydraulic and electrical robots) (Source:
Database created from several secondary sources)
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Figure 12: Repeatability of new robots introduced by large manufacturers (Note: CM(H)
and CM(E)- Cincinnati Milacron's hydraulic and electrical robots) (Source: Database
created from several secondary sources)
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Figure 13: Electrical control systems patents assigned to Robot manufacturers during
1970-1985
Electrical control system patents held by robot manufacturers in the U.S., 1970-1985
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Figure 14: Product line breadth of robot manufacturers in 1980
Product line breadth of Robot manufacturers
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